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Abstract
Cooperative behavior is common in nature even if selfishness is sometimes
better for an individual. Empirical and theoretical studies have shown that
the invasion and expansion of cooperators are related to an inhomogeneous
connectivity distribution. Here we study the evolution of cooperation on an
adaptive network, in which an individual is able to avoid being exploited by
rewiring its link(s). Our results indicate that the broadening of connectiv-
ity distribution is not always beneficial for cooperation. Compared with the
Poisson-like degree distribution, the exponential-like degree distribution is
detrimental to the occurrence of a higher level of cooperation in the contin-
uous snowdrift game (CSG).
Keywords: inhomogeneity, cooperation, adaptive network, continuous
snowdrift game
1. Introduction
Understanding the existence of cooperation in benefit-seeking biological
systems and human societies is one of the most fascinating problems studied
by biologists, physicists and sociologists[1, 2, 3, 4]. Traditionally, penalty-
based approach had been taken as the dominant mechanism for the mainte-
nance of cooperation[5, 6]. Until recently, to mimic the limited partnership in
individual interactions, population structures are introduced into the evolu-
tionary process. Among them, the regular network, the small world network
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and the scalefree network are the most popular static networks[7, 8, 9, 10].
On a static network, mutual interactions can only occur between the individ-
uals with immediate and fixed connections. Depended upon the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD) and the snowdrift game (SG)[11, 12, 13, 14], the role of topo-
logical properties in the invasion and expansion of cooperation have been
discussed a lot[15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
In real society, both the level of cooperation and the individual connection
are continuously evolving[20, 21, 22], such as that in the ultimatum game[23,
24, 25, 26], two interacting agents, called proposer and responder respectively,
share a given amount of money with a continuously changing ratio, and
other social dilemma games with a continuously changing linkage[27, 28,
29, 30]. In the present work, to address the effects of dynamic linkage on
the change of cooperative behavior, a kind of cost-benefit game, called the
continuous snowdrift game (CSG)[31, 32], and an adaptive network model
can be combined to serve as a practical tool.
In the CSG, a continuous variable x represents the level of cooperation,
such as the amount of money invested in a company or the time spent in
public affairs. The investment x not only benefits to the recipient but also
the donor itself. For a pairwise interaction between agent i who invests
x and agent j who invests y, the payoffs to i and j can be expressed as
P (x, y) = B(x + y) − C(x) and P (y, x) = B(y + x) − C(y) respectively, in
which B(x) and C(x) represent the benefit and cost functions. Mutation and
selection occasionally occur in the evolutionary process. The evolution of x
is governed by the invasion fitness f(y) = P (y, x)−P (x, x), which represents
the invasion ability of a rare mutant y into a population with a monomorphic
investment x.
On the adaptive network, personal preference and a potential partner’s
reputation are both very important for an agent to make a relinking decision[33,
34, 35]. For example, as an agent is ready to do business, he may choose a
cooperative investor who is willing to invest more or an experienced investor
who has made more profits from his former investment as his partner. In
this paper, we incorporate two kinds of agents, the agents with investment-
dependent preference (IDP) and the agents with wealth-dependent preference
(WDP), into the original CSG. In the rewiring process, an IDP agent tends
to reconnect to a generous investor and a WDP agent tends to reconnect to
the rich. We have two main findings in the present work.
(1) Compared with that on the static network, in the present model, co-
operative behavior is highly promoted on the dynamic network. The rewiring
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process promotes the formation of highly-investing clusters which helps the
cooperators defeat the defectors.
(2) In comparison with the Poisson-like degree distribution, the exponential-
like degree distribution is detrimental to the occurrence of a higher level
of cooperation. A theoretical analysis indicates that, on the network with
an exponential-like degree distribution, it is the inhomogeneous connectivity
that leads to the unstableness of cooperator clusters and thereafter a decrease
in average investment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the CSG model with IDP
and WDP agents and related variables are introduced. In Section 3, simu-
lation results are presented and discussed in detail. Analytical calculations
are given in Section 4 and conclusions are summarized in the last section.
2. The model
In the present model, there are N agents who are initially arranged on the
nodes of a random regular network (RRG) with average degree < k >. Each
agent has a pre-defined investment x which is a real variable between 0 and
1 and a specific preference for switching, IDP or WDP. The agents with im-
mediate connections make pairwise interactions and each agent’s investment
and linkage evolve according to the following procedures.
Step1: A randomly chosen agent i interacts with all its immediate neigh-
bors and a summed payoff is attained Pi =
∑ki
j=1[B(xi + xj) − C(xi)],
where ki is the degree of agent i and the benefit and cost functions satisfy
B(x) = b2x
2 + b1x and C(x) = c2x
2 + c1x respectively.
Step 2: Agent i compares its payoff with one of its immediate neighbors
agent j’s and gets its fitness fi = Pi−Pj. If fi < 0, with probability λ = −fiα ,
in which α = max(ki, kj)(Bmax − Cmin) is a normalization factor used to
ensure 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, agent i adopts the investment the same as agent j’s. Or
else, λ = 0.
Step 3: Occasionally, agent i replaces its investment with a mutant, which
is drawn randomly from a Gaussian distribution with its mean xi and variance
σ2. Just as that in ref.[31], in this paper we have the mutation probability
µ = 0.01 and the standard deviation σ = 0.005.
Step 4: The payoffs for agent i in the latest T time steps are accumulated
as wealth, that is, wi =
∑t
t′=t−T+1 Pi(t
′). If wi is less than the average wealth
< w >=
∑N
i=1 wi
N
, agent i rewires its link(s) with probability ψ ∈ [0, 1]. In
the reconnection process, an agent chooses its new partner according to its
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attachment preference, IDP or WDP. The ratio of IDP (or WDP) agents in
the population is PIDP (or PWDP ) , PIDP +PWDP = 1. An IDP agent chooses
its new partner according to its investment, that is, an agent j may be chosen
as agent i’s new partner with probability xj. A WDP agent chooses its new
partner according to its wealth, that is, an agent j may be chosen as agent
i’s new partner with probability
wj+ε∑N
i=1(wi+ε)
, where ε = 0.01 is used to avoid∑N
i=1(wi + ε) = 0. If an agent’s degree becomes 0 because of rewiring, it will
randomly choose an agent as its partner while the partner will randomly cut
one of its links. For each agent, the judgement about rewiring or not is made
every T time steps.
In the original CSG[31], the evolved investment x is governed by the
selection gradient G(x) = ∂f(y)
∂y
|y=x. The singular investment x* is the
solution of equation G(x) = 0, that is, B′(2x) − C ′(x) = 0. With quadratic
benefit and cost functions, the singular investment becomes x∗ = c1−b1
4b2−4c2 . If
dG(x)
dx
|x=x∗< 0, the singular gene value x* is stable and evolutionary branching
occurs for 2b2 < c2 < b2 < 0. If there is no solution for B
′(2x) − C ′(x) = 0
within the domain, x increases or decreases monotonically to the boundary.
In the present work, the network with degree distribution P (k) = δ(k− <
k >) is referred to as a homogeneous network and the network with a broader
degree distribution an inhomogeneous network. We are mainly concerned
about the role of network structure in the change of evolutionary branching
and the improvement of cooperation. Therefore, throughout the paper, we
adopt the benefit and cost functions used in ref.[31], that is, B(x) = −1.4x2+
6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x, with which evolutionary branching occurs, and
B(x) = −1.5x2 + 7x, C(x) = −x2 + 8x, with which the average investment
decreases to zero in the well-mixed case.
3. Results and discussions
We start by investigating how the rewiring process affects the evolutionary
branching and the average investment. Throughout the paper, the total
number of agents is N=5000 and the average degree of nodes is < k >= 6.
Figure 1(a) and (b) show the temporal average investment < x > in the
RRG. Compared with the results in the well-mixed case[31], in the static net-
work with degree distribution P (k) = δ(k− < k >), the structured process
has little effect on the system behavior. For b2 = −1.4, b1 = 6, c2 = −1.6,
c1 = 4.56, which satisfy 2b2 < c2 < b2 < 0, evolutionary branching occurs.
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Figure 1: Average investment versus time on a RRG network. The inset shows the cor-
responding investment distribution. (a)B(x) = −1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x;
(b)B(x) = −1.5x2 + 7x, C(x) = −x2 + 8x.
The two clusters evolve to x ∼ 0.01 and x ∼ 0.8 and the average investment
reaches < x >∼ 0.55. For b2 = −1.5, b1 = 7, c2 = −1, c1 = 8, the average
investment decreases monotonically to x ∼ 0.01.
As we incorporate the rewiring mechanism into the above evolutionary
process, the system behavior changes a lot. In Fig.2 (a) and (b) we give
the temporal average investment in the dynamic network for ψ = 0.5 and
different PIDP (or PWDP ). Other values of ψ have also been tried in the
simulation and it is observed that the change of ψ only affects the relaxation
time and the average investment but not the advantage of some kind of
relinking preference. Figure 2 (a) and (b) show that the rewiring process can
highly promote cooperation in the coevolutionary CSG. In comparison with
the results in Fig.1(a) and (b), the average investment increases obviously as
the two kinds of reconnection preferences are incorporated into the rewiring
process. As we consider the role of the ratio of IDP (or WDP) agents in
the population, we find that the existence of more IDP agents can make the
system reach a higher level of cooperation than that with more WDP agents.
In addition to that, from Fig.2(b) we also find that more WDP agents will
result in a large fluctuation in the average investment.
To have a close eye of the role of rewiring in the change of individual
investment, in Fig.3(a) and (b) we give the investment distribution after
50000 relaxation time. Figure 3 (a) shows that the rewiring process leads
to the disappearance of evolutionary branching observed in the RRG. In the
final steady state, nearly all the agents make the same investment on the
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Figure 2: Average investment versus time on a dynamic network for ψ = 0.5 and PIDP = 1
(black), 0.5 (blue), 0 (red). (a)B(x) = −1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x; (b)B(x) =
−1.5x2 + 7x, C(x) = −x2 + 8x.
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Figure 3: The investment distribution in the final steady state for ψ = 0.5 and PIDP = 1
(circles), 0 (squares). Averaged over 10 runs and in each run the data are obtained by
averaging over 10000 time steps after 50000 relaxation time. (a)B(x) = −1.4x2 + 6x,
C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x; (b)B(x) = −1.5x2 + 7x, C(x) = −x2 + 8x.
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Figure 4: The averaged investment in the final steady state as a function of PIDP for ψ =
0.5. Averaged over 10 runs and in each run the data are obtained by averaging over 10000
time steps after 50000 relaxation time. (a)B(x) = −1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x;
(b)B(x) = −1.5x2 + 7x, C(x) = −x2 + 8x.
dynamic network. From Fig.3(b) we observe that, for a large PIDP , the
investment distribution is like a delta function. But for a small PIDP , it
becomes broader. From the time dependent distribution we find that such a
broadened distribution results from the large fluctuation of the investment.
Figure 4 (a) and (b) show the averaged investment in the final steady state
as a function of PIDP . It is observed that < x > increases monotonically with
the rise of PIDP in both cases. As PIDP increases from 0 to unity, < x >
increases from 0.89 to 0.95 in Fig.4(a) while < x > increases from 0.24 to
0.44 in Fig.4(b). For N  1, the change of population size has little effect
on the change of < x >.
Because of the unequal wealth distribution, the inter-cluster connections
are continuously removed and reconnected as the investment evolves. To find
the effect of adaptive rewiring on the emergence of a typical network struc-
ture, in Fig.5 we plot the degree distribution of the evolved network in the
final steady state. All the parameters are the same as that in Fig.2(a). In
the system where all the individuals tend to set up new connections with the
agents with a larger investment (corresponding to PIDP = 1), P(k) evolves
to a Poisson-like degree distribution. But in the system where all the indi-
viduals tend to set up new connections with the agents with larger wealth
(corresponding to PIDP = 0), P(k) evolves to an exponential-like degree dis-
tribution. As we compare the results in Fig.2(a) with that in Fig.5, we find
that, compared with an exponential-like degree distribution, a Poisson-like
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Figure 5: The degree distribution of the evolved network for ψ = 0.5 and PIDP = 1
(circles), 0.5 (squares), 0 (triangles). Averaged over 10 runs and in each run the data
are obtained by averaging over 10000 time steps after 50000 relaxation time. B(x) =
−1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x. Inset: P(k) for PIDP = 0 (triangles) and the fitting
curve P (k) = 0.311e−0.232k
degree distribution is more beneficial for the occurrence of a higher level of
cooperation in the present model.
The above results are quite different from the results found in the static
network where an exponential degree distribution is more beneficial for coop-
eration [36]. To understand how such a difference comes from, in the following
we set up a firstly-dynamic-then-static (FDTS) network and have a close eye
of the relationship between < x > and P(k). The FDTS network is attained
as follows: start from a random regular network, at the first τ time steps,
the connection coevolves with the investment just as that in the dynamic
network. Then, the network becomes static while the investment evolves
further. Figure 6 (a) and (b) show the degree distribution in the FDTS net-
work for different ψ and τ . For a small rewiring probability ψ = 0.001, P(k)
becomes broader as τ increases from 1000 to 30000. But for ψ = 0.5, the
change of τ has little effect on the change of P(k). A broader P(k) means a
larger difference in degree between the agents. Therefore, Figure 6 indicates
that the inhomogeneity of individual connections increases with the rise of τ
for a small ψ but not for a large ψ. Other values of ψ > 0.01 are also tried
in the present model, compared with that in Fig.6(b), it is found that the
change of ψ only change the relaxation time but not the degree distribution
in the final steady state.
Accordingly, in Fig.7 (a) and (b) we plot the temporal average invest-
ment in the FDTS network. With rewiring probability ψ = 0.001, as τ
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Figure 6: The degree distribution in the FDTS network for PIDP = 1 and B(x) = −1.4x2+
6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x. (a) ψ = 0.001, τ = 1000(circles), 30000(squares); (b)ψ = 0.5,
τ = 1000(circles), 30000(squares). Averaged over 10 runs.
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Figure 7: Average investment versus time in the FDTS network for PIDP = 1 and B(x) =
−1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x. (a) ψ = 0.001, τ = 1000(black), 30000(red);
(b)ψ = 0.5, τ = 1000(black), 30000(red).
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Figure 8: The averaged investment in the final steady state as a function of σd in the (a)
FDTS network for ψ = 0.001 (circles) and (b) dynamic network for ψ = 0.5 (squares),
averaged over 10 runs. B(x) = −1.4x2 + 6x, C(x) = −1.6x2 + 4.56x.
increases from 1000 to 30000, the average investment increases from 0.6 to
0.75. However, with rewiring probability ψ = 0.5, the change of τ does not
change the average investment in the final steady state but the relaxation
time. The above results indicate that the system behavior is closely related
to the degree distribution in the FDTS network. Just as that in the static
network, a broader degree distribution is beneficial for cooperation in the
FDTS network.
To quantify the relationship between the average investment and the de-
gree distribution, in Fig.8 (a) and (b) we give the averaged investment in the
final steady state as a function of the standard deviation σd of the degree
distribution on the FDTS network and the dynamic network respectively. It
is observed that, on the FDTS network, < x > firstly increases with the rise
of σd. As the average investment reaches < x >∼ 0.75, it no longer changes
with the rise of σd. On the dynamic network, < x > decreases monotonically
with the rise of σd. A linear relationship < x >= aσd + b, where a ∼ −0.043
and b ∼ 1.068, is found.
The averaged investment represents the level of cooperation in the mixed
population and the standard deviation σd of the degree distribution repre-
sents the homogeneity or inhomogeneity of the individual connections. The
simulation results indicate that the broadening of connectivity distribution is
not always beneficial for cooperation. On a dynamic network, the Poisson-like
network structure is more beneficial for cooperators than the exponential-like
10
network structure.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. Improved cooperation on static networks with inhomogeneous connectiv-
ity
Firstly, let us consider how the broadening of the degree distribution
affects the evolutionary branching process.
Just as that in the well-mixed case in ref.[31], the evolution of investment
x on the RRG can be analyzed using the mean field theory. In the orig-
inal CSG, the equilibrium frequency ρ of x is determined by the equation
ρP(x,x)+(1-ρ)P(x,y)=ρP(y,x)+(1-ρ)P(y,y). On the RRG network, all the
agents have the same degree < k >. After the investments have converged
into the singular point x∗, evolutionary branching will occur on condition
that the coexisting strategies xi and xj (xi < x
∗ < xj) satisfy the equation
(ki − n)P (xi, xi) + nP (xi, xj) = nP (xj, xj) + (kj − n)P (xj, xi), (1)
where ki (or kj) is the degree of agent i (or j) and ki = kj and n (or ki − n)
is the number of agents connected to agent i with investment xj (or xi).
Suppose ki = 2n. Because P (xi, xj) = B(xi + xj) − C(xi) and P (xj, xi) =
B(xj + xi)− C(xj), equation (1) becomes
P (xj, xj)− P (xi, xi) = C(xj)− C(xi). (2)
On the network with inhomogeneous connectivity, such as those with
Poisson-like or exponential-like degree distribution, because the individual
interactions are related to different local connectivity, the above mean-field
analysis becomes difficult. To simplify the theoretical analysis, in the fol-
lowing, we suppose only two kinds of investment xi with degree ki and xj
with degree kj exist and they are evenly distributed in the population. The
wealth of agent i and agent j can be written as
wi = T [(ki − n′)P (xi, xi) + n′P (xi, xj)], (3)
wj = T [(kj − n′′)P (xj, xj) + n′′P (xj, xi)], (4)
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where n′(or n′′) is the number of agents connected to agent i (or agent j)
with investment xj (or xi). Suppose ki = 2n− kα, kj = 2n+ kα, and xi and
xj are well-distributed as an agent’s immediate neighbors, that is, n
′ = ki
2
,
n′′ = kj
2
, equations (3) and (4) become
wi = T (n− kα
2
)[P (xi, xi) + P (xi, xj)], (5)
wj = T (n+
kα
2
)[P (xj, xj) + P (xj, xi)]. (6)
Combine equations (2), (5) and (6), we obtain
wj − wi = Tkα
2
[P (xj, xj) + P (xj, xi) + P (xi, xi) + P (xi, xj)] > 0, (7)
which indicates that the equilibrium of the coexistence of xi and xj on the
RRG is destroyed on the network with inhomogeneous connectivity. The
larger the value of kα, the larger the difference in wealth.
Then, let’s see how the adaptive dynamics continue evolving after the
above state has been reached. Equation (7) implies that, on the network
with inhomogeneous connectivity, no matter what the investment is, the
agent with a higher degree keeps its state while the agent with a lower degree
learns from it. So that the clusters of the agents with the same investment
emerge. Suppose agent i in cluster xi meets agent j in cluster xj, the payoffs
are
Pi = (ki − 1)[B(2xi)− C(xi)] +B(xi + xj)− C(xi), (8)
Pj = (kj − 1)[B(2xj)− C(xj)] +B(xi + xj)− C(xj). (9)
On the condition ki = kj, xi < xj and P (xj, xj)−P (xi, xi) > C(xj)−C(xi),
we obtain
Pj−Pi = (ki−1){[B(2xj)−C(xj)]− [B(2xi)−C(xi)]}+[C(xi)−C(xj)] > 0.
(10)
Equation (10) implies that the agents in cluster xi will learn from the agents
in cluster xj, so that the cluster with a higher investment is stable while the
12
cluster with a lower investment is unstable. Therefore, on the network with
inhomogeneous connectivity, there will be more agents adopting a higher
investment in the final steady state.
4.2. Improved cooperation on a dynamic network
On the static network, although the broadening of the degree distribution
improves cooperation, the average investment can not reach the highest level
because of the existence of the agents with a higher degree and a lower
investment[32]. On the dynamic network, such a limitation is relaxed and
the cooperation is further improved.
Firstly, consider the evolution of cluster xi and xj (xi < xj) on the dy-
namic network. Let wim and wjn be the wealth of agent m and agent n
connected to agent i and agent j and having lower degrees km and kn respec-
tively.
wim = Tkm[B(2xi)− C(xi)], (11)
wjn = Tkn[B(2xj)− C(xj)]. (12)
For km = kn and B(2xi)− C(xi) < B(2xj)− C(xj), we obtain
wim < wjn. (13)
For wjn =< w >, wim is less than < w >. Therefore, compared with
agent n, agent m is more possible to rewire its link(s) and the degree of
agent i will decrease accordingly. The decrease in degree leads to the drop
of the wealth of agent i and it may learn from other agents with a higher
wealth. The agent with a higher degree and a higher investment is more
possible to be learned from and the average investment of the population
will increase accordingly. Therefore, the level of cooperation on a dynamic
network is higher than that on a static network.
Then, consider why the level of cooperation on the dynamic network
with a Poisson-like degree distribution is higher than that on the dynamic
network with an exponential-like degree distribution. For the network with
degree distribution P (k) = δ(k− < k >), the wealth of each agent is the
same as < w >. For a Poisson degree distribution, the ratio of the agents
whose wealth is lower than < w > is 1
2
whereas it is
∫<k>
1 e
−kdk∫∞
1 e
−kdk = 1− 1e<k>−1
for an exponential degree distribution. For < k >≥ 2, we get 1− 1
e<k>−1 >
1
2
.
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Therefore, there are more agents who are constantly rewiring their links on
the network with an exponential-like degree distribution than that on the
network with a Poisson-like degree distribution.
Finally, let’s have a look at how the average investment changes with the
ratio of the agents constantly rewiring their links. We divide the population
into three groups: group A with investment xa, group B with investment xb
and group C with investment xc. Suppose xa > xb > xc and the leaders in
the three groups are agent A, agent B and agent C respectively. Originally,
the number of the agents with a lower degree connected to A, B, C is equal,
nA = nB = nC =
N
3
. If only N
3
of the agents rewire their links, they should
be the agents with the lowest investment xc because of their lowest wealth.
They may reconnect to A, B, C equally and nA : nB : nC = 4 : 4 : 1.
Compared with that in the original case, we find the rise of the average
investment. If there are 2N
3
of the agents rewire their links, they should be
the agents with investment xc and xb and nA : nB : nC becomes 5 : 2 : 2.
If all the agents rewire their links, nA : nB : nC = 1 : 1 : 1 and the average
investment is the same as that in the first case. The above analysis shows
that, as we increase the ratio of the agents constantly rewiring their links, the
average investment firstly increases and then decreases. Therefore, a larger
fluctuation of cooperator clusters means a lower average investment, which
may be the reason for the decrease of the average investment on the dynamic
network with an exponential-like degree distribution.
Compared with that on the network with a Poisson-like degree distribu-
tion, there are more agents who are constantly rewiring their links on the
network with an exponential-like degree distribution. In the present model,
a higher level of cooperation is easier to be attained on the dynamic network
with a Poisson-like degree distribution than that with an exponential-like
degree distribution.
5. Summary
We study the level of cooperation of the CSG on a dynamic network.
Compared with the case on a static network, rewiring leads to the rise of
cooperation in the present model. The role of degree distribution in the im-
provement of cooperation is extensively studied. Contrary to the findings on
the static network, an exponential-like degree distribution is found to sup-
press cooperation in the coevolutionary dynamics. The theoretical analysis
indicates that the positively biased pay-off structure brings about the un-
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equal allocation of the wealth among the agents with different degrees. A
large difference in degree leads to a large difference in wealth and thereafter
the extreme instability of cooperator clusters, which results in the suppression
of cooperation on the network with an exponential-like degree distribution
in contrast to the network with a Poisson-like degree distribution.
The present work shows that, even if without an additional mechanism,
such as the increased cost, in the coevolutionary process, because of the exis-
tence of the agents with a higher degree and a low investment, the advantage
of the broadening of the degree distribution in the improvement of coopera-
tion may be lost and the agent with a higher degree may become the inhibitor
of cooperation . In the present model, we have only discussed the replicator
dynamics of investment x but not the individual relinking preferences. In re-
ality, it is possible that agent i becomes agent j’s identical offspring, including
both its investment and relinking preference. In the future, the coupled dy-
namics will be studied extensively in such a case and the difference between
the roles of dynamic and static networks in the change of system behavior is
the main interest of us.
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